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Book Reviews
Treaties And Executive Agreements in The United
States: Their Separate Roles And Limitations. By Elbert
M. Byrd, Jr. The Hague. Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. Pp. 276;
with appendices, bibliography, and index.
The separate provisions in our Constitution relating to
foreign affairs and the absence of any specific limitations
on the treaty power have long posed a problem of the
nature of limitations within this area, if any, and of
reconciling the respective powers of (1) the President,
(2) the President and Senate, and (3) Congress, over
foreign affairs. The confusion has been compounded by
dicta of the Supreme Court itself. Differing points of view
have been presented exhaustively in earlier and more
comprehensive works, such as the classic two volume
work of Butler and those works of Tucker, Corwin, and
others. The book under review is not presented as an
exhaustive or definitive work. It is a thoughtful', penetrating study and represents the author's effort to formulate a coherent legal theory in much of this area. It should
be consulted by students of this complicated subject. While
the author's thesis is too complex to be fairly summarized
within the limits of a review, a review may perhaps
properly start with what the author states is the "hard
core" of his theory. He says his major basic conclusions
(numerals inserted by reviewer for convenience of discussion) are:
"(1) the treaty making agency is a separate branch of
the federal government; the Senators in their treaty
approving role act simultaneously in a state and a
national capacity; (2) the legislative powers of Congress are adequate to the approval of many types of
international agreements; unlike the treaty power, the
legislative power of Congress is restricted 'by the
Tenth Amendment, and therefore the treaty power
must be used to effectuate an international agreement
when the legislative power as contemporarily con'

strued is not sufficiently extensive; when a legitimate
choice between the two powers exists, the legislative
power should be preferred for both political and,
theoretical reasons; (3) both powers are limited by
the specific prohibitions in the Constitution." (201-2)
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(1). The first proposition, admittedly novel at least in
emphasis, is in the author's view a justification for the
complementary conclusion that the treaty power as such
is a substantive power and is not limited by any state
powers either under the Constitution or the Tenth Amend
ment, except for a few express provisions like the guarantee of a republican form of government. Thus the theory
runs that in the exercise of the treaty power as such our
Government is unitary and not federal in nature. Whether
the conception that Senators act in part as ambassadors
from their respective states would in fact furnish any
protection against erosion of state powers through the
treaty power does not seem to necessarily follow; and,
if the guarantee of a republican form of government is to
furnish the states any meaningful protection, it will require a more liberal interpretation than it has received in
other areas.
(2). The power of Congress over foreign affairs, unlike
the treaty power, is delegated by express provisions (for
example, power over foreign commerce, tariffs, treaty implementing appropriations, and the like); hence, it must be
found in the Constitution and is subject to the Tenth
Amendment. The difference in their constitutional limitations so stated spotlights the great importance of the
choice between treaty and, "Congressional-Executive"
agreements ("those international agreements other than
treaties entered into under a combination of the powers
of the President and of Congress" (149)). The author
makes a strong case against their complete interchangeability, a theory propounded by some writers, pointing out
that such a doctrine would destroy constitutional distribution of powers.
(3). The third proposition, insofar as it states that the
treaty power as such is limited by the Constitution, requires the refutation of the inherent powers doctrine, viz.
that the treaty power is inherent in sovereignty and hence
is not derived from, nor restricted by, the Constitution.
This doctrine gained renewed vitality from the CurtissWright dictum of Mr. Justice Sutherland,' speaking for
a substantial majority of the Court. As the author points
out, it was widely and uncritically accepted by many
writers. These included Corwin, who edited in 1953 a
comprehensive work on the Constitution, under the direction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The
many lawyers who will heartily agree with the author's
1

United States v. Curtis-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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rebuttal of this theory will hope that he is correct in
concluding that the language of Mr. Justice Black in 1957
in Reid v. CovertI though speaking for himself and only
three other Justices, has in fact sub silentio overruled
Curtiss-Wright and buried the inherent powers doctrine
forever.
In addition to the points referred to, the author takes a
liberal view of the President's powers, particularly as
Commander-in-Chief, and the power of recognition, of
foreign governments, which do not require implementing
legislation. He likewise clarifies the classification of international agreements and other points.
Chapter summaries, a bibliography and appendices,
particularly one listing constitutional provisions wheh
may limit the treaty power, are helpful to students of the
subject.
Aside from questions listed by the author for further
study, there are two troublesome problems related to the
enforceability of treaty limitations: (1) How can treaties
as such, making domestic law, be made subject to court
review under present constitutional provisions which do
not require implementing legislation? Sometimes, of course
the treaty itself provides that it is to have no domestic
effect except insofar as so implemented. (2) How far will
the Supreme Court carry its rule of self-restraint that
foreign affairs involve political questions not subject to
court review, as in C. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Corp.,8
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,' etc.? The ordinary reader
will be always concerned as an individual in the use and
possible abuse of the treaty power in making domestic
law. How the author's theory of limitations would, affect
specifically such treaties as were proposed a few years
ago relating to Genocide, Covenant of Human Rights,
International Criminal Court, and other matters, is not
clear. The -public reaction to such treaties resulted in
assurances to the Senate that they would not be presented
for ratification during the administration then in, office.
This in turn contributed largely to the defeat by one vote
of passage by the Senate of a proposed constitutional
amendment. Because such treaties may be revived by
some future administration, it may be interesting to note
that the present State Department policy is as follows:
2354 U.S. 1 (1957).

8333 U.AS 103 (1948).
'246 U.S. 297 (1918).
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"Treaties are not to be used as a device for the purpose of affecting internal social changes or to try to
circumvent the constitutional procedures established
in relation to what are essentially matters of domestic
concern." (Appendix G, 251, not discussed by the
author in this context).
This policy statement recalls Mr. Chief Justice Hughes'
suggestion of thirty years ago, that there might be an implied limitation based on the grant of treaty power being
made in relation to external affairs.' The State Department
policy above quoted seems to depend on motives and may
not therefore provide a basis for an enforceable constitutional limitation. The author would presumably not believe the study of any such implied limitation profitable,
for he says, although not quite in the same context, "as
early as 1796 it was generally agreed that there was
really no way to differentiate between the subjects of domestic and foreign affairs." Probably most lawyers, however, irrespective of their views on constitutional limitations, would agree with the policy statement of the State
Department.
Within the limits set, this study does present a coherent
legal theory which should contribute to the search for one
which will be finally accepted. It does not purport to, nor
does it, answer satisfactorily all of the procedural problems and difficulties of practical application of constitutional limitations to domestic law when made by treaty
or "Congressional-Executive" agreements.
Frank B. Ober*
Law Finding Through Experience And Reason. By
Roscoe Pound. Athens, Georgia. University of Georgia
Press, 1960. Pp. 65. $2.50.
In this small volume are three lectures on jurisprudence
given by Dean Pound at the Centennial Celebration of
the University of Georgia School of Law earlier this
year. In lucid prose the author traces the development
of law from the strict law of the earlier Roman Republic
to the present, to present an historical framework within
5 Proceedings of the American Society of InternationalLaw (1929), 194,
196.
* Of the Baltimore City Bar; A.B. 1910, 'Princeton University; LL.B.
1913, Harvard University.
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which to move "toward a law of the world that is to bring
us world peace."
Dean Pound repeats his well-known definition of law
(ius) as an interaction between reason and experience
which, unlike legislation (lex), is, designed primarily to deal
with generalities in universal rather than in local terms. In
his first lecture he identifies the nineteenth century as
the period of maturity of the law and, argues that in our
century the law has tended to become socialized - that,
presently, judges tend to look at the consequences of the
continued application of a rule of law to see if the rule
has achieved a desirable social end rather than simply
deciding cases on the basis of often specious analogy.
In his second lecture he explores the varying approaches
to the doctrine of stare decisis and shows that the position
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter and others, recognizing the
maxim as an embodiment of a principle of social policy
rather than an inflexible rule of law, typifies the sociological approach of our time. In his final lecture he takes up
a number of cases from different fields of law, in which
the courts, by reasoning by analogy rather than employing the techniques of today's functional-sociological jurisprudence, have reached conclusions inapposite to the realities of modern life. These instances are carefully chosen
to enforce his argument. Thus, the analogy between the
law of capture of animals ferae naturae and the ownership
of deposits of gas and oil may some day, in Pound's view,
be regarded as the classic example of inapposite reasoning.
This is a thought-provoking book of prime interest to
those of the profession who are inclined to think of the
theory of law and jurisprudence, and to those who know
and value Dean Pound's thought. All who read it will
find a precis of Pound's legal philosophy.
Nelson Reed Kerr, Jr.*

Sacco-Vanzetti: The Murder And The Myth. By Robert
H. Montgomery. New York. The Devin-Adair Company,
1960. Pp. x, 348; with chronology and index. $5.00.
Mr. Montgomery's book presents an interesting reaction to the forty years of liberal activity and comment
which have followed what may well be this country's
* Of the Maryland 'Bar; A.B. 1955, Shimer College; LL.,B. 1959, University of Maryland.
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most debated criminal case, Sacco-Vanzetti. In those years,
many reputable writers have tended to vilify Judge
Webster Thayer, the prosecution, and all those in any
manner connected with the prosecution, especially the
United States Department of Justice, for discrimination
and unfairness regarding two defendants with anarchistic,
therefore unpopular, views. But Mr. Montgomery would
go farther in stating the "liberal" attitude toward SaccoVanzetti and would find it virtually a Communist text:
"SAcco-VANzMz
as myth is a murder engineered
by a decadent ruling class ('hangmen in frock coats')
to eliminate two radicals ('goddam agitators') who
were interfering with their betters and obstructing
their exploitation of the proletariat. * * *"
Unfortunately for those such as this reviewer who
would prefer a somewhat more disinterested approach,
this conclusion seems also the author's premise. Mr. Montgomery states that before the trial "there was no reason to
suspect [it] would not follow the course of ... any other
Massachusetts criminal trial with all civil rights protected." Then came the Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee, largely comprised, of "Communists, Socialists, and
'liberals' as well as anarchists. .. ." The myth resulted,
being forced, out of the trial, the post-trial motions,
appeals, and inquiries, by such agitators.
In spite of the author's one-sided approach and several
rather lengthy arguments with "liberal" commentators
on the case, such as Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the
book does present a rather carefully drawn analysis of
the facts produced before the Sacco-Vanzetti trial court
and adequately describes the later judicial and administrative hearings on the case. But the main value of THE
Muirmx
AND m MY=r is as an opinion to be read and
tempered with some of the earlier and "liberal" reports
of the case, which may have swung a bit far to the left
just as Mr. Montgomery swings a bit far to the right.
Robert J. Carson
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Nine Famous Trials. By John Evarts Tracy.
York. Vantage Press, Inc., 1960. Pp. 176. $3.50.

New

The law in all its aspects is drama to the lawyer; to the
layman the trial is often its most interesting aspect. John
Evarts Tracy's NINE FAMous TRIALS is the result of this
realization and the author's contribution toward interesting
laymen in the administration of justice through emphasis
on dramatis personae rather than technicalities.
Each of the chapters was first written as a paper for a
dinner group of which the author was the only lawyermember, and publication, is a result of the group's interest
The late Mr. Tracy (he died December 31, 1959, just after
the manuscript had been, completed) was Professor of
Law at the University of Michigan Law School, a practicing
lawyer, and the author of several other books.
The most remarkable facets of the present work are
the freedom of its language from esoteric legal terms and
its fresh approach to the trial. In dealing with the nine
trials the author not only clearly sets forth the facts of
each case with all the pertinent background, the points
of law involved, and the application of the law to the
facts, but he also describes the characters and personalties
of the parties involved, and of the judges and lawyers, and
points up the importance of the litigation in the public
view at the time.
Great care and discrimination are shown in the selection of the trials presented. Some illustrate the progress of
the law over the centuries, others the establishment of
great legal precedents, and all are interesting to a high
degree. The legal questions and principles presented run
the gamut from the constitutional questions involved in
the trial of Aaron Burr and in In re Neagle to problems of
property rights, admiralty, and criminal law.
The Annesley and Tichborne cases furnish two examples of the missing heir-claimant, famous in fiction as well
as in law. They are two fascinating mystery stories and
created much popular interest in their day. Here, technicalities of procedure and rules of evidence which have
since been changed are also shown.
In re Neagle, a most singular case, is given added dimensions by the author. Mr. Justice Field's family and
professional history, and the personalities and marital background of David S. Terry and his wife, who had threatened
to "get" Field, are related to give the case great dramatic
impact.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXI

Most moving of all the trials is perhaps the story of
the trial of Mary, Queen of the Scots. Elizabeth's reasons
to fear her, and Mary's reasons for acting as she did, are
revealed by the author as a setting for Mary's noble death.
It is the furnishing of such information which gives the
book its special value. The emotions and animosities of
the survivors of the wreck William Brown, the generosity
of Connecticut citizens in providing for the welfare of
negroes who had allegedly mutinied on a slave ship, the
politics surrounding the trial of Andrew Johnson - personal motivations and popular sentiment and reaction-are
brought in in such a way as to give meaning and body
to the dry facts of litigation. The legal points, clearly
presented, provide additional interest for the lawyer.
NiNE FAMous TRIALS concludes with an Epilogue, "The
So-Called Technicalities of the Law." Even though this is
the one area where there is a noticeable lapse into technical language, the outlook presented is valuable for both
laymen and lawyer in its attempt to portray our legal
system as a precept of civilized living. As a presentation
of the author's philosophy it indicates why he was able to
create a book appealing alike to layman and lawyer, and,
why his treatment of the trials has power to appeal
pleasurably to both.
Stewart Day*
* Chief Judge, Third Judicial Circuit, Maryland. LL.B. 196, University
of Maryland.

